Outsourcing induced by strategic competition

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Abstract

We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the “outside” (that do not compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that “inside” firms, by accepting such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing competition to sell the final product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside.

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1. Introduction

One of the principal concerns of any firm is to configure the supply of intermediate goods essential to its production. Of late, with the liberalization of trade and the lowering of barriers to entry, supply chain configurations have assumed global proportions. Indeed, in several industries, it has become the trend for firms to cut across national boundaries and outsource their supplies “offshore,” provided the economic lure is strong enough. Many diverse factors influence firms’ decisions. First, of course, there is the immediate cost of procuring the goods which—other things being equal—firms invariably seek to minimize. Then there is the question of risk: a firm may be unwilling to commit itself to a single party and instead spread its orders among others, even if they happen to be costlier, in order to ensure a steady flow of inputs. Sometimes a firm may tie up with a broad spectrum of suppliers so as to increase its access to the latest technological innovation, which could be forthcoming from any one of them. There can arise situations when a firm is impelled to select suppliers that will be strategic allies in its endeavor to penetrate newly emerging markets. For the analyses of these and other factors, and how they impinge on firms’ decisions, see, e.g., Jarillo (1993), Spiegel (1993), Vidal and Goetschalckx (1997), Domberger (1998), Aggarwal (2003), Shy and Stenbacka (2003), Yongmin Chen et al. (2004) and Yutian Chen (2011).

One intriguing possibility that has been alluded to, but not much explored, is that strategic incentives may arise in an oligopoly which outweigh other considerations and play the pivotal role in firms’ selection of suppliers. Instances of this are presented by Jarillo and Domberger, of which we recount only two.

The first case comes from Germany. AEG1 used to be a traditional supplier to both BMW2 and Mercedes Benz. At some point, with a view to vertical integration, Mercedes Benz acquired AEG. This caused BMW to look for a different supplier, despite the inevitable extra costs of the switch (see p. 67, Jarillo, 1993).

The second case involves General Electric (GE) in the United States. In the early 1980s, GE investigated the possibility of outsourcing its lower brand microwave ovens from outside, since these had become too costly to manufacture at its factory in Maryland. Discussions were first held with, and even trial orders given to, Matsushita which happened to be a major rival of GE and also the world leader for this product in terms of both volume and technology. But ultimately GE turned to Samsung, then a small company with little experience in microwaves. The strategy entailed additional costs, such...
Throughout our analysis, we consider a purely linear model, i.e., in which the costs of production for both \( \eta \) and \( \alpha \) are linear; as is the market demand for \( \alpha \).

Our main result is that, in this scenario, strategic considerations can come into play that will cause the firms in \( J \) to outsource \( \eta \) (outside) to \( O \) rather than (inside) to \( I \), even if the costs of manufacturing \( \eta \) are higher in \( O \) than in \( I \), so long as they are not much higher.

The intuition goes roughly as follows and is best seen when \( I \) and \( J \) consist of single firms and the outside fringe \( O \) is a competitive sector whose members simply quote their cost as the price at which they will provide the intermediate good (thus \( O \) has no strategic role here. However, we show that our results remain intact when \( O \) is taken to be strategic, indeed a monopolist, though at the cost of a more complicated analysis). Suppose (i) \( I \) and \( J \) are Cournot duopolists who compete in the market for the final product \( \alpha \); (ii) \( I \) and \( O \) can produce the intermediate good \( \eta \), but \( J \) cannot; and (iii) \( O \) cannot enter the market for \( \alpha \). Thus \( J \) must decide how to allocate its order of \( \eta \) between \( I \) and \( O \), and then how much of it to use in the production of \( \alpha \), freely disposing of the unused portion of \( \eta \). We show that the optimal course of action for \( J \) is to outsource exclusively to either \( I \) or \( O \), never to both, and to use the entire input \( \eta \) to produce \( \alpha \). Now if \( J \) outsources to \( I \), then \( I \) immediately knows the amount outsourced. This has the effect of establishing \( J \) as leader in the Stackelberg game that ensues in the market for \( \alpha \), in which \( I \) is forced to become the follower. In contrast, if \( J \) outsources to \( O \) then—thanks to the sanctity of the secrecy clause—\( I \) will only know that \( J \) has struck a deal with \( O \) but not the quantity that \( J \) has outsourced. Thus \( I \) and \( J \) will remain Cournot duopolists in the ensuing game on market \( \alpha \).

If costs for manufacturing \( \eta \) do not vary too much between \( I \) and \( O \), then \( I \) will earn less as a Stackelberg follower than as a Cournot duopolist. This will tempt \( I \) to push \( J \) towards \( O \) by quoting so high a price for the intermediate good \( \eta \) that, in spite of the premium that \( J \) is willing to pay for the privilege of being the leader, \( J \) prefers to go to \( O \). The temptation can only be resisted if it is feasible for \( I \) to provide \( \eta \) at such an exorbitant price that it can recoup as provider what it loses as follower. But such an exorbitant price is undercut by the competitive price prevailing at \( O \), as long as \( O \)’s costs are not too much higher than \( I \)’s. The upshot is that in any subgame-perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game, \( J \) will outsource to \( O \).

Which subgame gets played between \( I \) and \( J \) on market \( \alpha \)—Cournot or Stackelberg—is thus not apriori fixed, but endogenous to equilibrium. This is all the more striking since, in our overall game, the option is open for firm \( J \) to outsource to both \( I \) and \( O \) and to thus bring any “mixture” of the Stackelberg and Cournot games into play. The logic of the SPNE rules out mixing and shows that only one of the two pure games will occur along the equilibrium path.

Worthy of note is the fact that it is not \( J \) who has the “primary” strategic incentive to outsource to \( O \). This incentive resides with \( I \) who is anxious to ward off \( J \) and force \( J \) to turn to \( O \). The anxiety gets played out when \( O \) does not have a severe cost disadvantage compared to \( J \). Otherwise, \( I \) is happy to strike a deal with \( J \) since it can get high provider prices that compensate it for becoming a follower. That inside firms would want to provide inputs to their competitors at high prices is quite common and has been commented on (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990; Ordover et al., 1990; Rey and Tirole, 2007). What is surprising in our scenario is that high prices are quoted not to earn revenue at the expense of the competitor but instead to ward it off and compel it to seek its supply elsewhere.

The actual argument is more intricate and the exact result is presented in Section 4. As was said, there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for the outside firm \( O \). In fact, we suppose that \( O \) has a higher cost than \( I \) for manufacturing \( \eta \). Our main result states that, if \( O \)’s cost does not exceed a well-defined threshold, \( J \) will outsource to \( O \) in any SPNE.

Our formal model is as follows. The market for the intermediate good \( \eta \) meets first, followed by duopolistic competition between \( I \) and \( J \) on the final good \( \alpha \). Since the outside competitive fringe \( O \) stands ready to supply \( \eta \) at its cost price, firm \( I \) must counter this with a price quote of its own for \( \eta \). Then both firms \( I \) and \( J \), seeing these prices, decide how much of \( \eta \) to outsource to \( I \) and to \( O \). The outsourcing orders are subject to a secrecy clause, which is tantamount to \( I \) and \( J \) placing their orders simultaneously. The only act that could destroy the simultaneity is a preliminary announcement by \( I \) of the quantity of \( \eta \) it intends to produce (outside to itself). But, in the absence of an external enforcement agency, such an announcement would not constitute a credible commitment and would be like “cheap talk” which can be ignored. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 5.1.

The secrecy clause is crucial for our analysis. It can be upheld on the simple ground that it is routinely seen in practice (see, e.g., Temponi and Lambert, 2001; Ravenhill, 2003; Hoefft and Trott, 2006) and it is often a legally binding provision (see, e.g., Khalfan, 2004; Vagadia, 2007). The evidence supporting the secrecy clause is discussed in Section 5.2. Moreover we give a plausibility argument that, in certain scenarios, it holds endogenously in equilibrium.

It must also be pointed out that our model is one-shot (corresponding to discounting the future very heavily if one were to think of a multi-period setting) and in effect all goods are perishable.

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3 In particular, think of the following set-up. The market for \( \alpha \) is concentrated in the “developed world.” The firms in \( O \), on the other hand, are located offshore in the “developing world” and can manufacture \( \eta \) but lack the (advanced) technology for converting \( \eta \) to \( \alpha \). Even if some of them were to make the technological breakthrough, they would face not just the standard set-up costs for penetrating the market \( \alpha \), but further barriers to entry that pertain to foreign firms. This international setting perhaps makes our hypothesis of an outside fringe \( O \) more viable. But we do not need it, and all we formally postulate is the existence of this fringe.

4 The moment \( O \) has two or more (identical) firms, Bertrand competition will bring the price they quote down to the level of their cost and \( O \) will in effect be a competitive sector (note that we postulate linear costs and unbounded capacity). Thus, within the parameters of our model, \( O \) can be strategic only if it is a monopolist.

5 Thus we show that, even if it is permitted, free disposal of \( \eta \) will never be availed of in equilibrium.

6 Throughout our analysis, we confine ourselves to pure strategies.
With a long time horizon, durable goods and players who are patient, other kinds of SPNE would surely emerge. All these considerations—possibility of credible commitments, breakdown of the secrecy clause, long time horizon—are clearly important issues but lie beyond the scope of this paper.

Our analysis indicates that firms which position themselves on the “outside,” by not entering the market for the final product, are more likely to attract orders for intermediate goods. There is some evidence that this can happen in practice. By the mid-1980s (see Ravenhill, 2003), US companies in the electronics industry were looking “to diversify their sources of supply” in order to fare better against their Japanese competitors. Malaysia and Singapore made a strong bid to get the US business. A key feature of the government policies of both nations was that “they were not attempting to promote national champions in the electronic industry,” but the objective was rather “to build a complementary supply base, not to create local rivals that might displace foreign producers.” Their success in becoming major supply hubs for electronic components is well documented. Of course it is true that they had the advantage of low-cost skilled labor. But what we wish to underscore is their deliberate and well-publicized abstention from markets for the final products, which by itself gave them a competitive edge. To reiterate this implication of our analysis in more ambitious terms: the current widespread trend of outsourcing to offshore locations may well persist for strategic reasons, even if offshore costs were to rise, so long as the offshore companies abstain from the final product markets of their clients.

The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section 2. The model is presented in Section 3. The main result, together with an intuitive outline of its proof, is described in Section 4. It holds in both scenarios, whether the outside firm is strategic or part of a competitive fringe. Section 5 discusses some extensions and variations of the model. In Section 6 we revisit the main result and furnish its technical details via Theorems 1 and 2 (which may be safely skipped by the reader interested only in the essential qualitative message conveyed by the main result). The proofs of these two theorems are in the Appendix A (see, alternatively, Section 5 of Yutian Chen et al., 2010).7

2. Related literature

Outsourcing of inputs is such an important and widespread phenomenon that it has been studied from various points of view. First, it can be driven by cost considerations or by differences in productivity across firms (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Antrás and Helpman, 2004; and the references therein). A second argument is based on niche markets. A firm may be attracted to an exclusive outsourcing contract with a supplier who can provide highly specialized inputs, in order to market a differentiated final product that limits the intensity of price competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). There are explanations based on economies of scale. It is cost-effective to outsource inputs instead of undertaking redundant investment of one’s own, all the more so if one’s rivals have already gone to an outsider and created the scale there (Shy and Stenbacka, 2003). Even when the rival is doing in-house production, there is pressure to outsource because placing orders with the rival will only enhance its economies of scale and lower its costs, making it a more formidable competitor in the final goods market (Yutian Chen and Dubey, 2009). Another rationale for outsourcing is based on imperfect competition in the input markets. By outsourcing orders with a supplier to which its rival has already gone, a firm accomplishes two things: first, it raises the input price, which softens the competition in the final goods market and can generate a net gain (Buehler and Haucap, 2006); second, it prevents the rival from extracting monopolistic benefits from the supplier (Arya et al., 2008a). Another line of argument in favor of outsourcing runs as follows. A vertically integrated provider, which competes in the final product market, will have incentive to “hold up” its supply once investments have been sunk in the procurement process (Heaven, 2004). Furthermore there is the considerable risk that the business plans of the input-seeking firm will get revealed to its rival via the orders placed. On both counts, it is safer for the firm to outsource inputs to an outsider.

Of course, the other side of the story has also been discussed. If a negotiated agreement can be reached to share the gains, it could become optimal to order inputs from a rival (Spiegel, 1993). Indeed trade of intermediate goods may enable rivals to collude, via contractual agreements based on that trade, and thereby sustain a high price in the downstream market for the final product (Yongmin Chen, 2001; Yongmin Chen et al., 2004; Arya et al., 2008b).

Each of these explanations clearly has its own merit, but our purpose here is to bring a new strategic consideration to the fore which can sometimes be critical to firms’ behavior. To this end, we present a stripped-down model in which none of the factors mentioned are present. There are no cost benefits, comparative advantage, niche markets, economies of scale or possibility of collusion; nor is there reluctance in the firm to reveal its business plans to the provider. On the contrary, the strategic competition in our model creates incentive for the input-seeking firm to fully reveal its plans to the vertically integrated rival, with the intent of becoming Stackelberg leader in the final product market. It is the rival who, seeing through this ploy, refuses to play the role of the input provider and drives the firm to outsource elsewhere.

There is also considerable literature on endogenous Stackelberg leadership.8 The paper most closely related to ours, and inviting immediate comparison, is Baake et al. (1999). They consider a duopoly model to examine what they call “cross-supplies” within an industry—in our parlance, this is the phenomenon that a firm outsources to its rival. The “endogenous Stackelberg effect” is indeed pointed out by them: firm A, upon accepting the order outsourced by its rival B, automatically becomes a Stackelberg follower in the ensuing game on the final markets. But there are set-up costs of production in their model, and provided these costs are high enough, A can charge B a sufficiently high price so as to be compensated for being a follower. The upshot is that cross-supplies can be sustained in SPNE.

There are several points of difference between our model and ours. First, their argument relies crucially on the presence of sufficiently strong economies of scale (set-up costs). If these are absent or weak, there is no outsourcing in SPNE in their model. In contrast, in our model, outsourcing occurs purely on account of the endogenous Stackelberg effect (recall that we have constant returns to scale9). Second, outsourcing occurs only in some of their SPNE: there always coexist other SPNE where it does not occur. In our model, the outsourcing is invariant across all SPNE. In short, they show that outsourcing can occur, while we show that it must. Third, it is critical for their result that there be no outside suppliers.10 Such suppliers would generate competition that would make it infeasible for A to charge a high price to B, invalidating their result. In our model, the situation is different. We allow for both kinds of suppliers: those that are inside as potential rivals and others that are outside. It turns out that increasing the number of either type leaves our result intact (see Section 5.5). Finally—and this, to our mind, is the most salient difference—the economic phenomena depicted in Baake et al. and here are different, indeed almost complementary. In Baake et al., the issue is to figure out when a firm will outsource to its rival. Here we

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7 The Appendix A can be also accessed at http://economics.ryerson.ca/dsen/web_app/appendix.pdf.

8 E.g., Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Robson (1990), Mallath (1993), Pal (1996), van Damme and Hurkens (1999)—in all of which the timing of entry by firms is viewed as strategic.

9 Though outsourcing is further boosted by economies of scale in our model. See Section 5.5.

10 Recall that these are suppliers who are not present as rivals in the final product market.
consider precisely the opposite scenario and pinpoint conditions under which a firm will turn away from its rival and outsource instead to an outsider, even if the outsider happens to have a costlier technology. The fact that both models take cognizance of the endogenous Stackelberg effect is a technical—albeit interesting—point. What is significant is that this effect is embedded in disparate models and utilized to explain complementary economic phenomena.

3. The model

We shall first present Model 1 in which O is a strategic monopolist and then Model 2 where O is a competitive sector. The reason for this order is mathematical brevity: Model 2 can immediately be derived from Model 1 by the simple expedient of setting O’s provider price equal to its cost.

3.1. Model 1: strategic outside firm

For ease of notation, we substitute 0, 1, 2 for O, 1, 2. As was said, firms 1 and 2 are duopolists in the market for a final good \( \alpha \). An intermediate good \( \eta \) is required to produce \( \alpha \). Firm 1 can manufacture \( \eta \), but 2 cannot. There is an “outside” firm 0 which can also manufacture \( \eta \). What distinguishes 0 from 1 is that 0 cannot enter the market for the final good \( \alpha \). Firm 0’s sole means of profit is the manufacture of good \( \eta \) for the “inside” firms 1 and 2.

Let \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) be the respective quantities of \( \alpha \) produced by firms 1 and 2, and \( P(\cdot) \) be the price of \( \alpha \). The inverse market demand for good \( \alpha \) is as follows where \( a \) is a positive constant.

\[
P(x_1 + x_2) = a - x_1 - x_2 \quad \text{if} \quad x_1 + x_2 < a \quad \text{and} \quad P(x_1 + x_2) = 0 \quad \text{otherwise} \tag{1}
\]

The constant marginal cost of production of good \( \eta \) is \( c_0 \) for 0 and \( c_1 \) for 1. Furthermore both 1 and 2 can convert one unit of good \( \eta \) into one unit of good \( \alpha \) at the (for simplicity) same constant marginal cost, which w.l.o.g we normalize to zero. We assume

\[
0 < c_1 < c_0 < (a + c_1) / 2 \tag{2}
\]

The condition \( c_1 < c_0 \) gives a cost disadvantage to the outside firm 0 and loads the dice against good \( \eta \) being sourced to it. As \( (a + c_1)/2 \) is the monopoly price under cost \( c_1 \), the inequality \( c_0 < (a + c_1)/2 \) prevents firm 1 from automatically becoming a monopolist in the market for good \( \alpha \).

The extensive form game between the three firms is completely specified by the parameters \( c_0, c_1, a \) and so we shall denote it \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \). For \( i \in \{0, 1\} \) and \( j \in \{1, 2\} \), let

\[
qu_1^j \equiv \text{quantity of good } \eta \text{ outsourced by firm } j \text{ to firm } i \text{ and } x_1 \equiv \text{quantity of good } \alpha \text{ supplied by firm } j
\]

The game \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \) is played as follows.

Stage I: Firms 0 and 1 simultaneously and publicly announce prices \( p_0 \) and \( p_1 \) at which they are ready to provide good \( \eta \).

Stage II: For every \( (p_0, p_1) \), firms 1 and 2 play the two-stage game \( G(p_0, p_1) \) where

Stage 1: Firm 2 chooses \( q_2^1 \) (quantity of \( \eta \) to order from firm 1 at price \( p_1 \)).

Stage 2: For every \( (p_0, p_1, q_2^1) \), 1 and 2 play the simultaneous-move game \( G(p_0, p_1, q_2^1) \) where

1. Firm 1 chooses \( q_1^0 \) (quantity of \( \eta \) from firm 0 at price \( p_0 \), \( q_1^1 \) (quantity of \( \eta \) to produce by itself at cost \( c_1 \)) and \( x_1 \) (quantity of \( \alpha \) to put up in the final goods market) subject to:
   \begin{enumerate}[(i)]
   
   \item \( q_1^0 + q_1^1 \geq q_2^1 \) (the total amount of \( \eta \) is at least \( q_2^1 \) so that it is able to honor its commitment to supply \( q_2^1 \) units of \( \eta \) to firm 2) and
   \end{enumerate}

2. Firm 2 chooses \( q_2^2 \) (quantity of \( \eta \) to order from firm 0 at price \( p_0 \)) and \( x_2 \) (quantity of \( \alpha \) to put up in the final goods market) subject to \( x_2 \leq q_2^2 + q_2^1 \) (quantity of \( \alpha \) must be producible from the total \( \eta \) it has ordered).

It remains to describe the payoffs of the three firms at the terminal nodes of the game tree. Any such node is specified by \( p \equiv (p_0, p_1) \), \( q \equiv \{q_1^0, q_1^1\}_{i=0,1} \) and \( x \equiv \{x_1, x_2\} \). For \( i = 0, 1, 2 \), the payoff \( \pi_i \) of firm \( i \) is given by

\[
\pi_i(p, q) = p_i(q_i^0 + q_i^1) - c_i(q_i^0 + q_i^1) \quad \text{revenue from } \eta \quad \text{cost of } \eta
\]

\[
\pi_1(p, q, x) = p_1(x_1 + x_2) + p_1 q_2^1 - (p_0 q_1^0 + c_1 x_1) \quad \text{revenue from } \alpha \quad \text{revenue from } \eta \quad \text{cost of } \eta
\]

\[
\pi_2(p, q, x) = p_2(x_1 + x_2) - (p_0 q_2^2 + p_1 q_2^1) \quad \text{revenue from } \alpha \quad \text{cost of } \eta
\]

This completes the description of the game \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \).

Remark. (On the timing of moves)

We have supposed in our game that firm 2 chooses \( q_2^1 \) in stage II(1) after finding out \( p_0, p_1 \) announced in stage I; and that subsequently it chooses \( q_2^2, x_2 \) in stage II(2) but without knowing anything further than \( p_0, p_1, q_2^1 \). This is entirely equivalent to choosing \( q_2^1, q_2^2, x_2 \) simultaneously in stage II(1) after finding out \( p_0, p_1 \).

But for firm 1, the timing we have described is important. Firm 1 chooses \( q_1^0, q_1^1, x_1 \) after finding out the order \( q_2^1 \) placed by firm 2. This timing is logically necessary. Were firm 1 to announce \( q_1^0, q_1^1, x_1 \) before knowing \( q_2^1 \), it could always reneg on its announcement and choose a new \( q_1^0, q_1^1, x_1 \) after knowing \( q_2^1 \). Due to the secrecy clause, firm 2 does not even know if and when firm 1 has gone to 0, leave aside the quantity \( q_2^1 \) it has ordered. As for \( q_1^0 \) and \( x_1 \), these are known to firm 1 alone. Thus firm 1 has the full power to revise \( q_1^0, q_1^1, x_1 \). In the absence of binding contracts, which could be written before a third party such as a courthouse empowered to enforce it, the prior announcement of \( q_1^0, q_1^1, x_1 \) by firm 1 does not constitute a credible commitment and has no effect (see Section 5.1).

3.2. Model 2: competitive outside fringe

For contrast, and to gain better perspective, we shall consider a variant\(^1\)\(^2\) Model 2 in which O is a competitive fringe of many outside firms. In this scenario we may take the choice made by a representative firm 0 of \( O \) to be \( p_0 \equiv c_0 \) (so that \( m_0 \equiv 0 \)). Thus firm 0 is in effect a “strategic dummy” and we wind up with strategic competition only between firms 1 and 2. We denote this game \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \). The formal mathematical definition of \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \) is exactly the same as that of \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \) except that we take \( p_0 \equiv c_0 \) to be an exogenously fixed constant. We seek to find subgame-perfect pure strategy Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \) and \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \). Henceforth we shall often denote the games by simply \( \Gamma \) and \( \Gamma \).

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\(^{11}\) We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we formally incorporate free disposal in our model.

\(^{12}\) We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this variant.
4. The main result

Our main result asserts that if the cost disadvantage of the outside firm 0 is not too significant (i.e. \( c_0 - c_1 \) is not too large), then there is outsourcing to 0 in any SPNE of both \( \Gamma \) and \( \Gamma \).

The main result. (Strategic outside firm or competitive outside fringe)

There is a threshold \( \hat{\theta}(c_1) \in (c_1, (a + c_1)/2) \) such that if \( c_0 \in (c_1, \hat{\theta}(c_1)) \), then in any SPNE of either \( \Gamma \) or \( \Gamma \), firm 2 orders \( \eta \) exclusively from the outside firm 0.

Proof. For an intuitive outline, see Section 4.1, and for full details, see Section 6.1 in conjunction with the Appendix A.

Observe that when \( c_0 \in (c_1, \hat{\theta}) \), firm 0 has a cost disadvantage compared to firm 1, yet 2 outsources \( \eta \) to 0 rather than to 1. Strategic considerations dominate firms’ behavior here. To keep these strategic incentives in the forefront, we have assumed in the paper that \( c_0 > c_1 \). The main result is also summarized in Fig. 1, in which \( c_0 \) is varied on the horizontal axis, holding \( a \) and \( c_1 \) fixed.

This figure confirms our claim that outsourcing to offshore locations will persist for strategic reasons, even if offshore costs rise moderately so long as the offshore companies abstain from the final product markets of their clients.

4.1. Intuitive outline of the proof

Though the formal proof is in the Appendix A, and entails some necessary technical computations, its heuristic is quite straightforward and goes as follows. We apply backward induction to determine necessary technical computations, its heuristic is quite straightforward. Here

\[ \text{Proof.} \]

For an intuitive outline, see Section 4.1, and for full details, see Section 6.1 in conjunction with the Appendix A.

Observe that when \( c_0 \in (c_1, \hat{\theta}) \), firm 0 has a cost disadvantage compared to firm 1, yet 2 outsources \( \eta \) to 0 rather than to 1. Strategic considerations dominate firms’ behavior here. To keep these strategic incentives in the forefront, we have assumed in the paper that \( c_0 > c_1 \). The main result is also summarized in Fig. 1, in which \( c_0 \) is varied on the horizontal axis, holding \( a \) and \( c_1 \) fixed.

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5. Discussion and extensions

5.1. Credible commitment versus public announcement

When firm 2 orders \( q_1 \) units of the intermediate good \( \eta \) from firm 1, this constitutes a contract between the two parties, whereby 2 is able to credibly commit itself to the purchase of \( q_1 \) while 1 credibly commits to supply \( q_2 \) to firm 2. Were one party to renege on its purchase or sale, the other party would have recourse to the signed contract to take it to task.

The situation is quite different when firm 1 simply announces that it will produce \( q_1 \) units for itself. If 2 were to renege, would 1 take itself to task? In the absence of an external enforcement agency (like a courthouse), where 1 could go and write a binding contract to produce \( q_1 \) or else be liable for severe punishment, 1’s announcement is simply that: just “cheap talk” and not a credible commitment.

We rule out the possibility of such binding contracts in our model. Thus if we envisage the game where, anxious to be a Stackelberg leader, firm 1 first announces \( q_1 \) and then firm 2 comes to it to order \( q_2 \), 1 will always be free to change its mind later regarding \( q_1 \) upon hearing \( q_2 \). This fact is common knowledge to all the players. Hence every subsequent game follows an announcement by 1, is still \( \Gamma(c_0, c_1, a) \). Since we are looking at Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria, adding the initial announcements will have no effect and the same equilibria will occur in the subgames as before.

Were an external agency in place to enable 1 to make credible commitments, our analysis would no longer hold and it may well be possible for 1 to emerge as a Stackelberg leader, with 2 outsourcing to 1. But our model rules out such a mechanism.

5.2. The secrecy clause

It is crucial to our analysis that the quantity outsourced by any firm \( j = 1, 2 \) to 0 cannot be observed by the rival firm. This can be justified on the ground that outsourcing contracts in practice do incorporate secrecy (non-disclosure) clauses (see, e.g., Temponi and Lambert, 2001; Ravenhill, 2003; Hoecht and Trott, 2006). In fact, in many cases it is legally binding to have such clauses. Offshore outsourcing contracts are likely to come under the general purview of international trade laws that ensure protection of confidential information.

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14 Since we have linear costs and unbounded capacity, there is no autonomous costly action (such as building up excess capacity à la Dixit, 1980) that 1 can undertake to signal its commitment. An external agency is needed for this purpose.

15 For example, see Article 39 of TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), WTO (World Trade Organization, 1994) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e6_40_agm3_e.htm. Portions of Article 39 pertaining to non-disclosure clause are cited in Section 6.2 of Yutian Chen et al. (2010, p.27).
Turning more specifically to outsourcing contracts, there is evidence of widespread use of the secrecy clause. For example, in his study of projects outsourced to Kuwait, Khalfan (2004: 61) states that “Taking into consideration that a particular vendor may work simultaneously with two competing organisations, extra caution must therefore be exercised to ensure that data confidentiality is not compromised...” Similarly, discussing data protection laws of the European Union in the context of outsourcing, Vagadia (2007: 121) points out that contracting parties should agree “...not to divulge confidential information belonging to the other to any third party...”

The secrecy clause is indeed widely used in practice, which is why we took it to be exogenously given in our model. However, it can often be deduced to hold endogenously in equilibrium (in appropriately “enlarged” games). Indeed suppose that the quantity $q$ outsourced by 2 to 0 can be made “public” (and hence observable by 1) or else kept “secret” between 2 and 0. We argue that a public contract can never occur (be active) at an SPNE, as long as the game provides sufficient “strategic freedom” to its various players. For suppose it did occur: 1 knew that 2 buys $q$ units of $\eta$ from 0 at price $p_0$. Thus 1 is a Stackelberg follower in the final market $\alpha$, regardless of whom 2 chooses to outsource to $\eta$. It would be better for 1 to quote a lower price $p_0 - \varepsilon$ for $\eta$. This would be certain to lure 2 to outsource to 1. But $p_0 \geq c_0$ since 0 could not be making losses at the presumed SPNE; hence $p_0 - \varepsilon > c_1$ for small enough $\varepsilon$ (recall $c_0 - c_1$). By manoeuvring 2’s order to itself, firm 1 thus earns a significant profit on the manufacture of $\eta$. Hence, it loses a little on the market for $\alpha$ because 2 has a lower cost $\alpha_0 - \varepsilon$ of $\eta$ (compared to the $p_0$ earlier), but the loss is of the order of $\varepsilon$. Thus 1 has made a profitable unilateral deviation, contradicting that we were at an SPNE.

Note that our argument relies on the fact that 1 has the strategic freedom to “counter” the public contract. If, furthermore, 0 also has the freedom to reject the public contract and counter it with a secret contract, then— foreseeing the mentioned deviation by firm 1—firm 0 will only opt for secret contracts.

The most simple instance of such an enlarged game is obtained by inserting an initial binary move by 0 at the start of our game. This represents a declaration by 0 as to whether its offer to 2 is by way of a public or a secret contract. The game $\Gamma$ follows 0’s declaration. It is easy to verify that any SPNE of the enlarged game must have 0 choosing “secret,” followed by an SPNE of $\Gamma$. Of course, more complicated enlarged games can be thought of. For example, after the simultaneous announcement of $p_0$ and $p_1$ in our game $\Gamma$, suppose firm 2 has the option to choose “Public $q$” or “Secret $q$” in the event that it goes to 0, followed by “Accept” or “Reject” by 0. Clearly 1 finds $q$ only if “Public $q$” and “Accept” are chosen. On the other hand, if 0 chooses “Reject” we (still having to complete the definition of the enlarged game) could suppose that 2’s order of $\eta$ is automatically directed to 1. This game is more complex to analyze, but our argument mentioned still applies and shows that a public contract will never be played out in any SPNE.

We thus see that the secrecy clause can often emerge endogenously from strategic considerations, even though—for simplicity—we postulated it in our model. It is apparent that the firm placing orders (firm 2 in our model) may demand secrecy in order to protect sensitive information from leaking out to its rivals and destroying its competitive advantage. Our analysis reveals that the firm taking the orders (i.e., firm 0) may also—for more subtle strategic reasons—have a vested interest in maintaining the secrecy clause.

5.3. Price competition

One key issue is the extent to which our main result is sensitive to the mode of competition.\textsuperscript{16} Our result turns on the fact that when a non-integrated firm (firm 2 in our model) outsources inputs to its vertically integrated rival (firm 1), then 2 automatically becomes a Stackelberg leader in the market $\alpha$ for the final good, which stands to 2’s advantage because of the quantity competition on $\alpha$. But what if there was price competition instead on market $\alpha$? Would the Stackelberg “leadership premium” for 2 still obtain?

Much depends on the timing of moves, and the flow of information. In the current literature (e.g., Yongmin Chen, 2001; Yongmin Chen et al., 2004; Arya et al., 2008b), it is assumed that 2 outsources inputs to 1 after both have set prices and solicited demand on the final good market, and made it common knowledge. Under this assumption, the Stackelberg effect disappears. But if there is a gestation period of any significance in converting inputs into the final product, then this assumption is no longer viable, and it is more reasonable to suppose that inputs are outsourced and paid for upfront. Before the competition begins on the market $\alpha$ for the final good (at least as long as we contemplate “spot,” not “futures,” markets for the final good). The outsourcing order (by 2 to its vertically integrated rival 1) then becomes tantamount to a “capacity” build-up by 2 prior to price competition on market $\alpha$. This in turn has the effect of indirectly establishing 2 as Stackelberg leader, provided that the costs of 1 are sufficiently below those of alternative input suppliers that 2 could avail of on the outside (we omit all details, but see the recent paper by Pierce and Sen (2009), where a detailed analysis is carried out along these lines in the context of a Hotelling duopoly on market $\alpha$). To sum up: the Stackelberg effect, and thus also our main result, remains intact even in the presence of price competition as long as the vertically integrated rival’s costs for producing inputs are sufficiently lower than those of the outside firms.

5.4. Alternative pricing schemes

The pricing scheme we have considered in our model is unit-based, i.e., an input provider charges a constant price for each unit that it supplies. Although other schemes such as flat fees and profit-sharing arrangements are sometimes used in outsourcing, unit-based pricing is the most prevalent (see, e.g., Barthélemy, 2003; Robinson and Kalakota, 2004; Vagadia, 2007).

Not surprisingly, many papers (for instance, most of those that we have cited) are based on unit pricing. However, it is important to go beyond this benchmark and investigate alternative pricing schemes and their influence on the pattern of outsourcing. This is an issue that we hope to take up in future work.

5.5. Variations of the model

Our model can be varied in many ways, but the essential theme remains intact: if 0’s costs are not much higher than 1’s, 2 will outsource to 0. Here we briefly indicate a few possible variations.

5.5.1. Economies of scale

When there are increasing, instead of constant, returns to scale in the manufacture of the intermediate good $\eta$, a new strategic consideration arises, though it does not affect the tenor of our results. The primary strategic incentive to outsource to the outside firm 0 can shift from firm 1 to firm 2. For now 2 must worry that if it outsources $\eta$ to 1, then 1 will develop a cost advantage on account of economies of scale. In other words, 1 will be able to manufacture $\eta$ for itself at an average cost that is significantly lower than what it charges to 2. This might outweigh any leadership advantage that 2 obtains by going to 1. So, foreseeing a competitor in 1 that is fierce in spite of being a follower, 2 would prefer to outsource to 0 as long as 0’s price is not too much above 1’s. This, in turn, will happen if 0’s costs are not significantly higher than 1’s. But then, if 2 is outsourcing to 0, economies of scale can drive 1 to outsource to 0 as well!

These two strategic considerations, the first compelling 1 to push 2 towards 0 and the second compelling 2 to turn away from 1 on its own and to seek out 0, are intermingled in the presence of economies of scale. It is hard to disentangle them and say precisely when one fades

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\textsuperscript{16} We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.
out, leaving spotlight on the other. But by eliminating economies of scale altogether, we were able to focus on just the first scenario, wherein the game turns essentially on the informational content of the strategies.

Economies of scale can easily be incorporated in our model. Suppose the average cost $c_i(q)$ of manufacturing $q$ units of $i$ falls (as $q$ rises) for both $i = 0, 1$. For simplicity, suppose $c_i(q)$ falls linearly and that $c_i(0) = \lambda c_i(q)$ for some positive scalar $\lambda$. It can then be shown that there exists a threshold $\lambda^* > 1$ such that if $\lambda < \lambda^*$:

(i) firm 2 outsource to firm 0 in any SPNE,

(ii) both firms 1 and 2 outsource to firm 0 in any SPNE when economies of scale are not too small.

This result is established in Yutian Chen and Dubey (2009).

5.5.2. Discriminatory pricing

The outsourcing result for increasing returns hinges on the fact that 0 cannot quote discriminatory provider prices to 1 and 2, otherwise 0 could benefit by setting different prices in sequence to 1 and 2.

One reason firm 1 might conceivably buy from 0, at a price necessarily as high as $c_0$ (and therefore higher than its own cost $c_1$), is to make public its order and become a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis 2. But this is ruled out by the secrecy clause.

Alternatively, firm 1 may decide to buy its inputs from 0 in order to influence 0’s pricing to its rival firm 2. This line of reasoning has been formally developed in Aarya et al. (2008a) as follows. The outside supplier 0 offers its input prices to firms 1 and 2 in sequence. In this setting, when firm 1 places its input orders with firm 0, it is in 0’s interest to ensure high sales for 1 in the market $\alpha$ for the final good. This induces firm 0 to set a high input price for firm 2 subsequent to the deal 0 has struck with 1. Thus the overall effect is that, by ordering first from 0, firm 1 effectively raises the price of its rival firm 2. This result in Aarya et al. (2008a) is driven by their critical assumption that firm 1 must commit on its “make-or-buy” decision before 0 sets its input price for 2. In contrast, in our model, we impose no such advance exclusivity commitment: firm 1 can buy its inputs from 0 as well as make them in-house. When 1 is given this flexibility, it will not purchase from 0 because the equilibrium price offered by 0 cannot be lower than $C_0 > C_1$. Forseeing that firm 1 will produce its inputs entirely in-house, the incentive for firm 0 to favor 1 by setting a high price for 2 will disappear in our setting.

5.5.3. Multiple firms of each type

Suppose there are $n_1, n_2$ replicas of firms 1 and 2. The timing of moves is assumed to be as before, with the understanding that all replicas of a firm move simultaneously wherever that firm had moved in the original game. Restricting attention to type-symmetric SPNE, Theorem 1 again remains intact with a lower threshold in terms of the value of $\hat{h}(c_1)$.

5.5.4. Only outside suppliers

The strategic incentives that we have analyzed can arise in other contexts. Suppose, for instance, that 1 and 2 both need to outsource the supply of the intermediate good $\eta$ to outsiders $\ominus = \{O_1, O_2, \ldots\}$. If 2 goes first to $\ominus$ and 1 knows which $O_i$ has received 2’s order, then 1 will have incentive to outsource to some $O_j$ that is distinct from $O_i$, even if O’s costs are higher than O’s, so long as they are not much higher. For if 1 went to O,

it might have to infer the size of 2’s orders and thus be obliged to become a Stackelberg follower (e.g., because O has limited capacity and can attend to 1’s order only after fully servicing the prior order of 2). Alternatively, even if 1 does not know who 2 has outsourced to, or indeed if 2 has outsourced at all, it may be safer for 1 to spread its order among several firms in $\ominus$ so that it minimizes the probability of becoming 2’s follower. We leave the precise modeling and analysis of such situations for future research.

6. SPNE of $\Gamma$ and $\tilde{\Gamma}$: the detailed characterization

In this section we fully characterize the SPNE of $\Gamma$ in Theorem 1 and of $\tilde{\Gamma}$ in Theorem 2. These two theorems together furnish the technical details of the main result. To enunciate them simply it will be useful to first state the following (intuitively credible) lemma:

**Lemma 1.** In any SPNE of $\Gamma$ or $\tilde{\Gamma}$, we must have (i) $p_0 \geq c_1$ and (ii) $q_1^* = 0$ (firm 1 does not outsource to firm 0).

**Proof.** See the Appendix A or Section 4.1 of Yutian Chen et al. (2010).

6.1. Main features of SPNE

By Lemma 1, in any SPNE play of $\Gamma$ or $\tilde{\Gamma}$, firm 1’s constant marginal cost is $c_1$. Before describing the results formally, it will be useful to summarize five main features of an SPNE which capture the essential strategic interactions in our model (and whose formal proofs, as was said, are in the Appendix A like all other proofs).

(i) **Exclusive order of $\eta$ by firm 2:** for the game $G(p_0, p_1)$ that follows the announcement $(p_0, p_1)$ (for $\tilde{\Gamma}$, $p_0 \equiv c_0$), 2 orders $\eta$ exclusively either from firm 1 at price $p_1$ (i.e. $q_2^* = 0$) or from firm 0 at price $p_0$ (i.e. $q_2^* = 0$).

(ii) **No wastage of $\eta$:** every unit of $\eta$ ordered by firm 2 is completely utilized to supply $\eta$, i.e. $q_2^* + q_2^* = x_2$. For firm 1, every unit of $\eta$ that it produces is completely utilized either to supply $\alpha$ or to provide $\eta$ to firm 2, i.e. $q_1^* = q_2^* + x_1$.

(iii) **Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes:** if 2 orders $\eta$ from 1, the amount $q_2^*$ has a commitment value prior to the play of the ensuing game $G(p_0, p_1)$ which establishes 2 as the Stackelberg leader in market $\alpha$. If 2 orders $\eta$ from 0, then 1 and 2 stay as Cournot duopolists. Accordingly, one of the following duopoly games is played in market $\alpha$, where firm 1’s unit cost is always $c_1$.

• $\mathcal{K}(p_0)$: the Cournot duopoly with firms 1, 2 where 2 has unit cost $p_0$.

• $\mathcal{S}(p_1)$: the Stackelberg duopoly with firm 2 as the leader and firm 1 the follower where 2 has unit cost $p_1$.

Let $(k_1(p_0), k_2(p_0))$ be the quantities of firms 1 and 2 in the unique NE of $\mathcal{K}(p_0)$ and $(s_1(p_1), s_2(p_1))$ be the quantities in the unique SPNE of $\mathcal{S}(p_1)$. Define the constrained leader and follower outputs as

$$s_2(p_1) = \min(s_2(p_1), k_2(0)) \text{ and } s_1(p_1) = \max(s_1(p_1), k_1(0))$$

In the game $G(p_0, p_1)$, (a) the Cournot outcome is played if $(x_1, x_2) = (k_1(p_0), k_2(p_0))$ and (b) the Stackelberg outcome is played if $(x_1, x_2) = (s_1(p_1), s_2(p_1))$.

(iv) **Leadership premium for firm 2:** let $\phi_2(p_0)$ and $L(p_1)$ be firm 2’s profits in $\mathcal{K}(p_0)$ and $\mathcal{S}(p_1)$. Whether 2 prefers the Cournot or the

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17 Thus $c_i(q) = \max(0, c - bq)$ and $c_i(q) = \lambda \max(0, c - bq)$ for positive scalars $b, c, \lambda$.

18 It is needed here that the economies of scale be not too pronounced, otherwise pure strategy SPNE may fail to exist. More precisely, for the average cost function $c_i(q) = \max(0, c - bq)$, it is assumed that $0 < c - c_2/2a$ to guarantee (i) the existence of pure strategy SPNE and (ii) in equilibrium, the quantity produced entails positive marginal cost.

Note that in our main model discriminatory prices are of no avail on account of constant returns to scale: firm 1 will always produce $\eta$ by itself at a lower cost $c_1$ and ignore $O$’s offer.
Stackelberg outcome depends on its unit costs at these two duopolies. If \( p_1 \leq \rho_0 \), then clearly 2 would prefer to be the Stackelberg leader rather than a Cournot duopolist. Even if \( p_1 > \rho_0 \), 2 would still prefer to be the leader as long as \( p_1 \) is not too large, that is, firm 2 is willing to pay a premium in terms of higher cost to be the leader. There is a continuous and increasing function \( \tau(p_0) \) that represents this leadership premium, i.e.,

\[
L(p_1) = \frac{1}{2} \phi_2(p_0) \iff p_1 = \frac{1}{2} \tau(p_0)
\]  

(3)

If \((p_0, p_1)\) is part of an SPNE of \( \Gamma \), then \( p_1 = \tau(p_0) \), making firm 2 just indifferent between the Cournot and the Stackelberg outcomes.21 Due to this, to identify SPNE it is useful to define for any interval \([u, v] \subseteq [c_1, (a + c_1)/2]\),

\[
(\text{Graph } \tau)[u, v] \equiv \{(p_0, p_1) | p_0 \in [u, v], p_1 = \tau(p_0)\}
\]

Fig. 2 portrays (Graph \( \tau)\)[u, v].

(v) **Threshold for regime change:** let \( \phi_1(p_0) \) and \( \phi(p_1) \) be firm 1’s profits in market \( x \) in \( \Xi(p_0) \) and \( \Xi(p_1) \). Under the Cournot outcome, firm 1 receives no order of \( \eta \) from firm 2 (i.e., \( q_2 = 0 \)), so firm 1’s payoff is simply \( \phi_1(p_0) \). Under the Stackelberg outcome, firm 2 orders its required \( \eta \) exclusively from firm 1 (i.e., \( q_2 = s_2(p_1) \)), so 1 obtains \( p_1 - c_1 s_2(p_1) \) from market \( \eta \) and its payoff is \( F(p_1) = F(p_1) + (p_1 - c_1 s_2(p_1)) \). Taking \( p_1 = \tau(p_0) \), firm 1 obtains \( F(\tau(p_0)) \) if the Stackelberg outcome is played. There is a constant \( \tilde{\theta}(c_1) \) that represents the threshold for regime change22 for firm 1 as follows:

\[
\phi_1(p_0) = F(\tau(p_0)) \iff p_0 \leq \tilde{\theta}
\]  

(4)

Thus, firm 1 prefers the Cournot outcome if and only if \( p_0 \leq \tilde{\theta} \). Firm 0 receives no order under the Stackelberg outcome, so it obtains zero payoff there. Under the Cournot outcome, \( q_2 = k_2(p_0) \), so firm 0 obtains \( p_0 - c_0 k_2(p_0) \). Thus, firm 0 prefers the Cournot outcome if and only if \( p_0 \geq \tilde{\theta} \). By the Nash Equilibrium reasoning, it follows that the Cournot outcome is played in an SPNE only when both 0 and 1 prefer this outcome, which is the case if and only if \( c_0 \geq \tilde{\theta} \). On the other hand, the Stackelberg outcome is played in an SPNE only when both 0 and 1 prefer this outcome, which is the case if and only if \( c_0 \leq \tilde{\theta} \).

6.2. Characterization of SPNE

**Theorem 1. (Strategic outside firm)**

There is a threshold \( \tilde{\theta} \equiv \tilde{\theta}(c_1) \equiv (c_1, (a + c_1)/2) \) such that, in the game \( \Gamma \) the following hold.

(i) If \( c_0 \in (\tilde{\theta}, (\tilde{\gamma}, (a + c_1)/2)) \), there is a continuum of SPNE, indexed by supplier prices \( \{p_0, p_1\} \in \Gamma(\tilde{\gamma}) \). For any such \( \{p_0, p_1\} \), firm 2 outsources \( \eta \) to the outside firm 0 and the Cournot outcome is played in \( G(p_0, p_1) \), i.e., \( q_2 = q_0 = q_1 = x_1 = k_1(p_0) \) and \( q_2 = q_2 = s_2(p_0) \).

(ii) If \( c_0 \in (\tilde{\theta}, (a + c_1)/2) \), there is a continuum of SPNE, indexed by supplier prices \( \{p_0, p_1\} \in \Gamma(\tilde{\gamma}) \). For any such \( \{p_0, p_1\} \),

21 The reason is if firm 2 strictly prefers one of these outcomes, the firm that is supplying \( \eta \) to 2 at that outcome can improve its payoff by slightly raising the price of \( \eta \). This result does not necessarily hold for the game \( \Gamma \) as firm 0 has no strategic role there.

22 Both \( \tau(p_0) \) and \( \tilde{\theta}(c_1) \), which occur in the statements of Theorems 1 and 2, have simple closed-form formulae in terms of the exogenous parameters \( c_0, c_1 \) of the model, and are presented in Section 6.3 in the end of this paper. They may appear cryptic, but are required for the sake of completeness (see the Appendix A, or Section 5 of Yutian Chen et al. (2010)) for their derivation and justification.

\[
\text{(Graph } \tau)[u, v] \equiv \{(p_0, p_1) | p_0 \in [u, v], p_1 = \tau(p_0)\}
\]

\[
\phi_1(p_0) = F(\tau(p_0)) \iff p_0 \leq \tilde{\theta}
\]

\[
\text{Theorem 2. (Competitive outside fringe)}
\]

There is a threshold \( \tilde{\theta} \equiv \tilde{\theta}(c_1) \equiv (c_1, (a + c_1)/2) \) (same as the threshold in Theorem 1 with the strategic outside firm) such that, in the game \( \Gamma \) the following hold.

(i) Same as Theorem 1 except that \( p_1 \in [\tau(c_0), +\infty) \) and the continuum of SPNE are equivalent in real terms.

(ii) Same as Theorem 1 except that the continuum of SPNE collapses to a unique SPNE with \( p_1 = \tau(c_0) \).

(iii) Finally, if \( c_0 = \tilde{\theta} \), there is a continuum of SPNE. In one of these, \( p_1 = \tau(c_0) \) and firm 2 outcomes \( \eta \) to firm 1. The rest are indexed by \( p_1 \in [\tau(c_0), +\infty) \), are equivalent in real terms and have firm 2 out sourcing to firm 0.

**Proof.** See the Appendix A or Section 5 of Yutian Chen et al. (2010).

6.3. The functions \( \tau \) and \( \tilde{\theta} \)

For the sake of completeness, we give the formulae for the functions \( \tau, \tilde{\theta} \) that appear in the statements of Theorems 1 and 2 (they are derived in the Appendix A, alternatively Section 5 of Yutian Chen et al., 2010).

Define \( \tau_1, \tau_2 : [c_1, (a + c_1)/2] \rightarrow R_+ \) as

\[
\tau_1(p_0) := \frac{4p_0(a+c_1-p_0)}{3(a+c_1)} \quad \text{and} \quad \tau_2(p_0) := \frac{3-2\sqrt{2}}{6+2\sqrt{2}}(a+c_1)/3
\]
Denote
\[ \bar{\theta}(c_1) := \left( \sqrt{2-1}(a + c_1) / 2 \right) \]

The function \( \tau(p_0) \) is the continuous and increasing function defined by
\[ \tau(p_0) = \begin{cases} \tau_1(p_0) & \text{if } p_0 < \bar{\theta}(c_1) \\ \tau_2(p_0) & \text{if } p_0 \geq \bar{\theta}(c_1) \end{cases} \]

Define \( \theta_0(c_1, c_0) := c_0/2 + (a + c_1)/4 \) and
\[ \hat{\theta}_1(c_1) := \left[ 4c_1 + a - \sqrt{a^2 - 7ac_1 + c_1^2} \right] / 5 \]
\[ \hat{\theta}_2(c_1) := a / 14 + 13c_1 / 14 \]

Let \( \rho \equiv 23 / \left[ 121 + 84 \sqrt{2} \right] \). Define the continuous function \( \hat{\theta} \) by
\[ \hat{\theta}(c_1) := \begin{cases} \hat{\theta}_1(c_1) & \text{if } c_1 < \rho a \\ \hat{\theta}_2(c_1) & \text{if } c_1 \geq \rho a \end{cases} \]

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Appendix A. Supplementary data

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