

Department of Economics  
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## RESEARCH INTERESTS

International Trade, Environmental Economics, Game Theory, Applied Microeconometrics

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## EDUCATION

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| 2019 | Ph.D., Economics, Ryerson University (Defended August 9th)<br>Thesis: "Essays on the Incentives to Form International Agreements between Asymmetric Countries"<br>Supervisor: Professor Paul Missios  |
| 2011 | Teaching English as a Second Language (TESL), (Diploma with Honours), Humber College, Toronto, ON   |
| 2009 | Diploma of Candidate of Economic Sciences, Novosibirsk State Agrarian University, Novosibirsk, Russia<br>Thesis: "International Trade Development of Agricultural Organizations under the Food Market Formation"<br>Supervisor: Professor Olga Sokolova |
| 2004 | Bachelor Degree in Philology, Barnaul State Pedagogical University, Russia  |
| 2003 | Specialist Degree in Management (BS+MA), Altai State University, Russia (Diploma with Honours)  |

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## RESEARCH PAPERS

- "Incentives to Form Joint International Trade and Environmental Agreements" (with [P. Missios](#))
- "Preferential Trade Agreements, Externalities and Domestic Policy" (with [P. Missios](#))
- "The Creative Destruction of Hurricanes: A Study of Indian Firms" (with [M. Pelli](#), [J. Tschopp](#), and [K. Eklou](#)),  
 submitted to *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*
- "Monopolistic Competition with Credence Goods under Asymmetric Information"
- "Shallow versus Deep Integration of International Agreements" (with [P. Missios](#))
- "Exclusion, Self-Exclusion and Deep Trade Agreements" (with [P. Missios](#))

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## CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

- 2019 Canadian Environmental and Resource Economics Association, Charlottetown, Canada. Paper: "Incentives to Form Joint International Trade and Environmental Agreements"
- 2019 Canadian Economics Association Meeting, Banff, Canada. Paper: "Shallow versus Deep Integration of International Agreements"
- 2019 Canadian Resource and Environmental Economics Association, PhD Workshop, Calgary, Canada (Travel Stipend of \$500 Honorarium). Paper: "Shallow versus Deep Integration of International Agreements"
- 2017 Canadian Economics Association Meeting, Antigonish, Canada. Paper: "Monopolistic Competition with Credence Goods under Asymmetric Information"

## AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

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Ontario Graduate Scholarship (OGS) (Ryerson University, 2014-2015)  
Ontario Graduate Fellowship (Ryerson University, 2013-2014)  
Ryerson Graduate Award (Ryerson University, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014)  
Ryerson Graduate Scholarship (Ryerson University, 2012-2013)  
Altai State University Research Grant (Altai State University, Altai, Barnaul, Russia, 2008-2009)  
Mayor's Grant (Altai, Barnaul, Russia, 2001-2002 and 2002-2003)  
Rotary Club Scholarship (Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2000)

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: TEACHING

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Courses Taught, Ryerson University:

Intermediate Macroeconomics I, CECN/ECN 301 (2016 and Present)  
Economic Issues in Money and Banking, ECN 509 (Present)  
The Economics of Sex, CECN/ECN 512 (2018 - Present)  
Money and Banking, CECN/ECN 506 (2017 - 2019)

Teaching Assistant, Ryerson University:

Courses: Microeconomics (PhD), Mathematical Economics (PhD), Microeconomics (Master's), Game Theory, Econometrics, Statistics for Economics, Money and Banking, Macroeconomics, Microeconomics

Courses Taught, Altai State University:

International Trade, Investment, Basics of Securities Valuation, Basics of Business, Innovation Management

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: RESEARCH/OTHER

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2013 - 2019	Graduate Research Assistant, Ryerson University
2014 - 2019	Dr. Jeanne Tschopp, Applied Economist, Labour Economics and International Trade Primary Software: STATA
2019	Pr. Paul Missios, Environmental Economics, International Trade
2012	Administrative Coordinator at SNC Lavalin Inc, Toronto, Report Structure (Reporting to VP of Engineering) Historical analysis of project budgets, preparation of overhead budget reports, yearly projections

## SOFTWARE AND PROGRAMMING SKILLS

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STATA, Maple, R, Excel, Microsoft Word, PowerPoint, LaTeX and LyX

## PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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2015 CILT 100 Learning and Teaching in Higher Education I (Professional Development in Teaching), Learning & Teaching Office in association with the SEDA UK Professional Development Framework, Ryerson University  
2014 - Present: Active Participation in Workshops Arranged by Learning & Teaching Office, Ryerson University

## ACTIVITIES

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Yoga (Certified Instructor), Cycling, Running

## REFERENCES

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Dr. Paul Missios, Professor  
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Dr. Halis Murat Yildiz, Professor  
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## ABSTRACTS

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Job Market Paper: **“Shallow versus Deep Integration of International Agreements”** with [P. Missios](#)

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have increasingly included elements not specifically related to trade, such as domestic policy over the environment, labour, intellectual property, health and investment. In this paper, we develop a model of multiple asymmetric countries, and we examine the equilibrium agreements and environmental outcomes assuming (i) domestic policy agreements are negotiated separately, (ii) trade agreements are shallow (trade only), and (iii) trade agreements are deep (border and domestic policy). Furthermore, in order to examine the differences between shallow and deep trade agreements, we develop extended games where countries can choose between different deep and shallow PTAs. To circumvent the multiplicity of Nash equilibria, we use the equilibrium refinement of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, and show that domestic policy-only agreements, shallow trade agreements and deep trade agreements have very different equilibrium outcomes in terms of membership, welfare and external effects, and for the pursuit of global free trade. While pure domestic policy agreements may fail to yield an effective equilibrium agreement, we show that deep agreements will often be chosen over shallow agreements and typically do not change the participants in any agreement.

**“In the Eye of the Storm: Firms and Capital Destruction in India”** with [M. Pelli](#), [J. Tschopp](#), [K. Eklou](#), *Submitted*

This paper examines the response of firms to capital destruction. Using Indian firm sales data and tropical storms as an exogenous shock on firms' capital, we find evidence of creative destruction. Within industry, less productive firms suffer disproportionately more, both along the intensive (firm sales) and extensive (firm exit) margins. The effect found across industries is 33% larger, and indicates that capital destruction leads to a shift in sales towards comparative advantage industries. This build-back better effect is driven by firms active in multiple industries and, to a large extent, by shifts in the firm-level production mix within a firm's active set of industries. Finally, while there is no evidence that firms adjust by investing in new industry lines, firms tend to abandon production in industries that exhibit lower comparative advantage. Our baseline estimates imply that for the top 25% of storms, the median firm's industry sales decrease by at least 2.5%. The exit rate of the median firm increases by at least 2% for the top 25% of storms.

## **“Preferential Trade Agreements, Externalities and Domestic Policy”** with [P. Missios](#)

As multilateral trade barriers fall, there are increasing concerns that domestic policies will be used to undermine the welfare-enhancing globalization effects of tariff cooperation. We examine how the ability to use domestic instruments affects the formation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Customs Unions (CUs), and the resulting implications for the pursuit of free trade. In our comparative advantage-based asymmetric country framework, we examine how optimal tariffs relate to domestic policy choices in foreign countries, and how negotiated restrictions on trade policy affect both domestic policies and the incentives to enter different trade agreements. We show that externalities and unrestricted domestic policy can result in the same equilibrium trade agreements as the case with no externalities and no domestic policy, but can also lead to different equilibrium trade agreements, depending on the nature and extent of the externality and the degree of asymmetry across industries.

## **“Monopolistic Competition with Credence Goods and Asymmetric Information”**

The global markets for organic and GMO-free products are rapidly growing. Uncertainty about the quality of these products is critical, and consequently affects international trade in these goods. As credence goods (where the quality of the product is indeterminate to the consumer even after purchase), the markets for organic and GMO-free products differ considerably from experience goods markets. In particular, consumers cannot update their beliefs based on their experience with the product. As a result, consumers have to rely on certification, and producers, in order to face a full demand and charge higher prices, have little choice but to obtain this signal of their quality. To investigate this, we bring asymmetric information into the Melitz-Ottaviano (2008) model and analyze firms’ self-selection into different groups of domestic producers and exporters based on two levels of firms’ heterogeneity: productivity and credence quality, where both characteristics are not directly observable by consumers. High credence quality firms decide to self-select themselves into a group of certified domestic producers and exporters or to serve domestic and export markets without certification and get mixed in with their low credence quality counterparts after observing their level of credence quality, the cost of certification, and their marginal cost of production.

## **“Incentives to Form Joint International Trade and Environmental Agreements”** with [P. Missios](#)

International trade, along with trade-promoting preferential trade agreements, are often criticized for their potential damaging effect on the environment. Further, there may exist incentives for governments to alter domestic environmental policies in order to affect their firms’ competitiveness and thereby increase the gains from trade. The growing number of trade agreements that include different environmental norms illustrates these concerns. To examine the different incentives to enter agreements and to manipulate industrial policy, we utilize a perfectly competitive two-country, comparative advantage model with cross-border externality spillovers. We analyze incentives to form pure environmental agreements, shallow (trade-only) agreements and deep (trade and domestic policy) agreements. We show that these agreements have very different outcomes in terms of world and country-specific welfares, trade specialization and environmental damages, and the extent to which the level of the externality and the degree of comparative advantage (production asymmetry) affect the incentives to enter these agreements.

## **“Exclusion, Self-Exclusion and Deep Trade Agreements”** with [P. Missios](#)

Deep trade agreements include domestic policy restrictions regarding the environment, labour, intellectual property, health and investment, in addition to trade liberalization. In this paper, we develop a comparative advantage-based model with asymmetric countries and both trade and domestic policy instruments, in order to find the differences in equilibrium trade agreements. In doing so, we examine how the incentives to join agreements differ between shallow (trade-only) and deep agreements, and how the inclusion of domestic policy restrictions affects the incentives of countries to free-ride, exclude other countries, or self-exclude. Depending on the asymmetry between industries and domestic externalities, these incentives may result in different compositions of trade agreements but still increase world welfare as deep agreements are chosen over shallow agreements.